<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T05:38:04Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/10570" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/10570</identifier><datestamp>2026-09-24T02:07:23Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Parlar, Mahmut</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Hassini, Elkafi</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">McCabe, Peter</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Leng, Mingming</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Business</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2014-06-18T16:51:54Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2014-06-18T16:51:54Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="created" lang="en_US">2011-07-28</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">2005</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">opendissertations/5607</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">6630</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">2120224</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/11375/10570</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://doi.org/10.71548/20462</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">&lt;p>In this thesis we focus on applications of game theory in supply chain management (SCM). Most significant---and interesting---topics arising in SCM are concerned with the coordination/cooperation and competition among supply chain members. Since the theory of non-cooperative and cooperative games is used for the analysis of situations involving conflict and cooperation, it has become a commonly-used methodological tool in investigating supply chain-related problems.&lt;/p> &lt;p>We start with an introduction in Chapter 1. In this chapter, we briefly describe game theory and SCM, and the organizational structure of this thesis. Next, we present a literature review for game theoretical applications in SCM in Chapter 2. This chapter reviews more than 130 papers concerned with supply chain-related game models, which are categorized based on a topical classification scheme. In Chapter 3, we consider a free shipping problem in a B2B setting. We model the problem as a leader-follower game under complete information with a seller as the leader and a buyer as the follower, and compute the Stackelberg solution for this game. In Chapter 4, we analyze the problem of allocating cost savings in a three-level supply chain involving a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. We use concepts from the theory of cooperative games to find allocation schemes for dividing the total cost savings among the three members. Chapter 5 considers game-theoretic models of lead-time reduction in a two-level supply chain involving a manufacturer and a retailer. In this chapter, we first develop a leader-follower game where the manufacturer determines the components of his lead-time and the retailer decides on her order quantity. This game is solved to find the Stackelberg equilibrium. We also investigate the cooperation between the two members and design a linear side-payment contract for this supply chain. Our thesis ends with a conclusion in Chapter 6.&lt;/p></dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Business</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Business</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Competition and cooperation in supply chains: Game-theoretic models</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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