<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T00:35:13Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/11619" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/11619</identifier><datestamp>2014-06-18T16:55:38Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Griffin, N.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Kobasigawa, Yoshimichi</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2014-06-18T16:55:38Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2014-06-18T16:55:38Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="created" lang="en_US">2011-12-10</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">1995-12</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">opendissertations/6574</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">7619</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">2397138</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/11375/11619</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">&lt;p>Frege did not develop an analysis of the sense of demonstrative or indexical expressions. It is possible, though, to understand Frege's analysis of thoughts as providing a set of constraints on the sense of all expressions, including demonstratives and indexicals. It will be shown that, for Frege, the sense of a demonstrative/indexical expression "α", must conform with the following four constraints:&lt;/p> &lt;p>(FS 1) The sense of "α" is a mode of presentation of a reference.&lt;/p> &lt;p>(FS 2) The sense of "α" must be a determinant of the cognitive significance of a rational person's understanding of the sentence "α is Φ".&lt;/p> &lt;p>(FS 3) The sense of "α", along with the senses of the other constituent expressions of the sentence "α is Φ", which expresses a thought, must determine a fixed truth value.&lt;/p> &lt;p>(FS 4) The sense of "α" is a determinant of the objective content of what is said by someone uttering "α is Φ" as well as the objective judgeable content of "α is Φ"&lt;/p> &lt;p>In this paper, I will attempt to investigate whether there is anything which demonstratives/indexicals possess which conforms with these constraints.&lt;/p> &lt;p>I will attempt to show that demonstratives/indexicals possess something which may be characterized as modes of presentation of reference, which are determinants of cognitive significance, as well as determinants of fixed truth values. To this end, I will develop an account of the cognitive significance of a rational person's understanding of demonstrative/indexical sentences. I will also attempt to show that a demonstrative/indexical possesses something which may be characterized as a mode of presentation of reference, and which, with qualification, is a determinant of the objective content of what is said by someone uttering a sentence containing the demonstrative/indexical as a constituent expression.&lt;/p> &lt;p>We will see that as a result of my investigation of demonstrative/indexical expressions, we must distinguish four non-identical types of contents which can be possessed by indexical/demonstrative utterances, i.e., cognitive significance, "grasped content", "re-expressible content" and linguistic meaning.&lt;/p></dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Master of Arts (MA)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">THE COGNITIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF AND WHAT IS SAID BY DEMONSTRATIVE AND INDEXICAL SENTENCES</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">thesis</dim:field>
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