<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T06:29:50Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13210" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13210</identifier><datestamp>2026-09-24T01:07:01Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Sarkar, Sudipto</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Jiaping Qiu; Trevor Chamberlain</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Khokhar, Abdul Rahman</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Business</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2014-06-18T17:03:11Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2014-06-18T17:03:11Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="created" lang="en_US">2013-08-16</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">2013-10</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">opendissertations/8031</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">9101</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">4448533</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13210</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://doi.org/10.71548/11415</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">&lt;p>This thesis explores the following three important issues in the field of corporate finance: window dressing in corporate cash holdings, market effects of SEC regulation of short-term borrowing disclosure and market response to dividend change announcements by unregulated versus regulated firms.&lt;/p> &lt;p>First, I find strong evidence of upward window dressing in cash holdings by U.S. industrial firms during the fourth fiscal quarter. This behavior is robust to several controls and a December year-end dummy. Further cross-sectional analysis reveals that the window dressing is sensitive to firm size and level of information asymmetry. I also find that firms manipulate discretionary accruals to dress up fourth quarter cash, perhaps to gain favourable credit terms on issuing short-term debt.&lt;/p> &lt;p>Second, I use portfolios of financial and non-financial SEC registrants to examine the market reaction to proposed SEC short-term borrowing disclosure regulation. Using event study methodology, I find that the market reaction is positive and significant at the announcement date and negative and significant at the voting date. Overall, I observe a positive market reaction, indicating the usefulness of the disclosure from the vantage point of users. The results for various subsets confirm the expectations and suggest that a “one-size-fits-all” approach to regulation is undesirable.&lt;/p> &lt;p>Finally, I use large samples of dividend increase and decrease announcements for the period 1960 to 2010 in order to compare stock price reactions of unregulated and regulated firms. I observe a stronger market reaction to the dividend increase announcements of unregulated firms compared to those of regulated firms after controlling for firm characteristics, market factors and contemporaneous earnings announcements, a result consistent with the dividend signaling hypothesis and uniqueness argument for regulated firms. However, I find that the market reaction to dividend decrease announcements is similar for unregulated and regulated firms. The cross-sectional analysis further confirms that the stronger stock price reaction to dividend increase announcements of unregulated firms is associated with the level of information asymmetry.&lt;/p></dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Empirical Corporate Finance</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Cash Holdings</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Dividend Policy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Regulation</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Information Asymmetry</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Finance and Financial Management</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Finance and Financial Management</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">THREE ESSAYS IN EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
</dim:dim></metadata></record></GetRecord></OAI-PMH>