<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T04:25:06Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13816" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/13816</identifier><datestamp>2026-09-24T06:17:16Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Vorobej, M.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Sullivan, Andrew</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2014-06-18T17:05:21Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2014-06-18T17:05:21Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="created" lang="en_US">2013-12-02</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">1996-09</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">opendissertations/8646</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">9661</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">4865465</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/11375/13816</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://doi.org/10.71548/16808</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">&lt;p>It seems everyone who encounters David Lewis's modal real ism finds it utterly strange. I attempt to show that it is strange because it expands our onto logy unnecessarily.&lt;/p> &lt;p>I begin by situating Lewis in the tradition of understanding modality with the help of possible worlds. I go on to indicate the internal tensions which arise under Lewis's view when we consider sane kinds of perfectly normal modal discourse. T try to show that the problem comes from an understanding of existence which is quite common in analytic philosophy. I then suggest a way of understanding modal language which finds its inspiration in the writings of st Thomas Aquinas, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Donald Davidson.&lt;/p></dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Master of Arts (MA)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">The modal realism of David Lewis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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