<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T04:16:55Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/15828" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/15828</identifier><datestamp>2026-09-24T04:25:00Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Allen, Barry</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Campbell, Neil</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2014-08-28T13:03:20Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2014-08-28T13:03:20Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">1993-02</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/11375/15828</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://doi.org/10.71548/8633</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">This thesis is a criticism of the theory in the philosophy of mind known as "eliminative materialism". While this theory has been advocated by a number of philosophers, none have pressed its thesis harder than Paul Churchland. Consequently, Churchland's work in this area has been the focus of current debates in the philosophy of mind.&#xd;
Although several philosophers have developed significant objections to Churchland's formulation of the thesis, Churchland has always been ready with a convincing reply. For this reason I propose to attack Churchland on as fundamental a level as seems possible, namely, by questioning his prE~supposition that folk-psychological explanation is a species of causal explanation. Without this presupposition there is little reason to expect Churchland's proposed theoretical elimination of folk psychology by neuroscience;&#xd;
for&#xd;
folk-psychological&#xd;
explanation&#xd;
(principally,&#xd;
reasongiving)&#xd;
must&#xd;
be&#xd;
characterized&#xd;
as&#xd;
a&#xd;
species&#xd;
of&#xd;
causal&#xd;
explanation&#xd;
if&#xd;
it&#xd;
is to be replaced by&#xd;
a&#xd;
better&#xd;
causalexplanatory&#xd;
theory of behaviour.&#xd;
I&#xd;
argue&#xd;
that reason-giving explanations&#xd;
are&#xd;
not&#xd;
a&#xd;
species&#xd;
of&#xd;
causal explanation.&#xd;
By undermining&#xd;
one&#xd;
of&#xd;
the&#xd;
central presuppositions of eliminative materialism,&#xd;
I&#xd;
hope&#xd;
to cast sufficient doubt on Churchland's thesis.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degreetype" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Master of Arts (MA)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">en_US</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Philsosphy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Materialism</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Reasons, Causes, and Eliminative Materialism</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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