<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T02:32:43Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/18951" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/18951</identifier><datestamp>2026-09-24T00:09:04Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Earn, David</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Molina, Chai</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Mathematics and Statistics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2016-03-14T19:59:04Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2016-03-14T19:59:04Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2016</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/11375/18951</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://doi.org/10.71548/19103</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">Many interesting behaviours in the animal and human world involve cooperation among&#xd;
individuals. Yet, cooperating individuals are often susceptible to exploitation by cheaters.&#xd;
Because cheaters do better than the cooperators they exploit, the evolution and persistence&#xd;
of cooperation has been a challenging topic of study in biology, sociology and economics.&#xd;
Studies often abstract from real cooperative interactions, and construct simple games&#xd;
in which players can choose either cooperation with other players, or defection, e.g., the&#xd;
well known prisoner’s dilemma and the snowdrift game. In these games and other social&#xd;
dilemmas, mutual cooperation yields greater payoffs than mutual defection, but individuals&#xd;
are still tempted to defect (because of the possibility that if they cooperate, the other player&#xd;
will defect).&#xd;
Similar dilemmas also arise in situations where multiple individuals may be affected by&#xd;
the actions of one (such as volunteering for community service or evading taxes), and the&#xd;
main theme of this thesis is cooperation in groups. In chapter 2, we analyze pre-emptive&#xd;
vaccination for an outbreak of smallpox (following a bioterrorist attack or accidental release),&#xd;
from the public health (i.e., group) and individual perspectives. Chapters 3 and 4&#xd;
deal with an extension of the snowdrift game to n interacting players and continuous strategy&#xd;
sets (where individuals decide on their degree of cooperation): in chapter 3, we analyze&#xd;
global evolutionary stability of cooperative strategies in a large class of n-player snowdrift&#xd;
games in infinite populations; chapter 4 analyzes general continuous n-person snowdrift&#xd;
games in finite populations, and compares the evolutionary dynamics with their infinite&#xd;
population analogues. In chapter 5, we present a general framework to model selection&#xd;
processes in finite populations, necessary for the analysis in chapter 4.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degreetype" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Public goods</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Vaccination</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Selection processes</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Finite population</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Evolutionary stability</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Fixation</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">The good, the finite, and the infinite</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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