<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T04:23:43Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/23890" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/23890</identifier><datestamp>2026-09-24T22:14:39Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Pirvu, Traian</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Mbodji, Oumar</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Mathematics and Statistics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2019-02-07T14:38:45Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2019-02-07T14:38:45Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2018</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/11375/23890</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://doi.org/10.71548/8513</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">Decisions such as saving, investing, policymaking, have consequences in multiple time&#xd;
periods and are called intertemporal. These choices require decision-makers to trade-off costs and benefits at different points in time. Time preference is the preference&#xd;
for immediate gratification or utility over delayed gratification. The discount rate is&#xd;
a tool used to measure this psychological phenomenon.&#xd;
This thesis considers the problem of an individual maximizing his utility from&#xd;
consumption and final wealth when his discount rate is not constant. The question&#xd;
we answer is the following: if we allow the individual to update his decisions, will he&#xd;
stick to his original strategy or will he switch?&#xd;
We show that there are cases in which the individual's strategy keeps changing&#xd;
thus his behaviour becomes time inconsistent. In Chapter 1, we introduce two notions&#xd;
to solve this inconsistency problem: The agent can pre commit i.e. he does not&#xd;
change his original optimal strategy. The agent can also plan for his future changes of&#xd;
strategy and adopt time consistent strategies also known as subgame perfect strategies.&#xd;
We also review the existing literature on time discounting and time consistency.&#xd;
Chapter 2 considers the time consistency in the expected utility maximization&#xd;
problem. The risk preference is of the Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) type,&#xd;
the time preference is specified by a non constant discount rate and we allow the volatility of the stock price to be stochastic. We show that the determination of one&#xd;
quantity: the utility weighted discount rate completely characterizes the individual's&#xd;
subgame perfect strategies.&#xd;
Chapter 3 is about equilibrium pricing in a model populated by several economic&#xd;
agents in a complete financial market. These agents are investing, saving&#xd;
and consuming and want to maximize their expected utility of consumption and &#xd;
final wealth. We allow the economic agents to differ in their risk preferences, beliefs&#xd;
about the future of the economy and in their time preferences (non constant discount&#xd;
rates). Since the optimal strategies are time inconsistent, the equilibrium is&#xd;
computed by using the time 0 optimal ( precommitment) strategies for the market&#xd;
clearing conditions.&#xd;
Chapter 4 considers the same model as chapter 2. We solve the equilibrium&#xd;
problem when time consistent strategies are used for the market clearing conditions.&#xd;
We limit the study to two economic agents. The subgame perfect equilibrium is&#xd;
compared to the optimal equilibrium of Chapter 3.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degreetype" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">time consistent, portfolio, optimization, discount rates</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Time Consistent Behaviour and Discount Rates</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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