<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T02:43:51Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/28774" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/28774</identifier><datestamp>2026-09-24T02:01:49Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Stotts, Megan</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Mahhouk, Shahdah</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2023-08-04T19:16:56Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2023-08-04T19:16:56Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2023</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/11375/28774</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://doi.org/10.71548/17730</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">I explore the epistemic justification of self-beliefs regarding personality traits within the internalism-externalism debate. Historically, the question of epistemic justification of self-beliefs has been discussed only with respect to our beliefs about our current mental states while the epistemic justification of our self-beliefs about our personality traits was assumed not to be any different from the justification of our beliefs about the external world. However, I use empirical psychology to highlight a few unique characteristics of our self-beliefs about personality traits that make the typical application of internalist or externalist standards less straightforward. These characteristics have to do with the biases and the self-verification that accompany our self-beliefs about our personality traits. I argue that externalism, in general, and virtue reliabilism, in particular, are more suitable to the context of our self-beliefs about our personality traits than other theories of justification. However, I contend that within the virtue reliabilism framework, a self-belief-forming process can become more competent if it generates self-belief from the instances where individuals manifest the trait in question while having the motivation and opportunity to do otherwise. I show how this condition makes the self-belief-forming process more competent and, therefore, makes the produced self-beliefs more epistemically justified.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degreetype" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Master of Philosophy (MA)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Self-Beliefs</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Epistemic justification</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Virtue Reliabilism</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Self-Beliefs and Epistemic Justifications</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" qualifier="alternative" lang="en_US">WHAT MAKES OUR SELF-BELIEFS ABOUT OUR PERSONALITY TRAITS EPISTEMICALLY JUSTIFIED?</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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