<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T07:45:54Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/29713" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/29713</identifier><datestamp>2026-09-24T20:35:19Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Han, Seungjin</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Sam, Alex</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Economics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2024-05-01T13:15:53Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2024-05-01T13:15:53Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2024</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/11375/29713</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://doi.org/10.71548/18123</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">This thesis consists of three chapters in microeconomic theory concerning strategic interactions among parties with asymmetric information. The first chapter, ''Cheap Talk with Private Signal Structure" (co-authored with Maxim Ivanov) and published in Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 132 (2022), pages 288-304, addresses the question of how a designer of information --- which is privately observed by other players --- can benefit from designing it privately. The second chapter, ''Multidimensional Signaling with a Resource Constraint" (co-authored with Seungjin Han), studies competitive monotone equilibria in a multidimensional signaling economy where senders invest in their multidimensional signals (cognitive and non-cognitive) while facing a resource constraint. The third chapter, ''Consumer Privacy Disclosure in Competitive Markets", studies how competition among multi-product sellers with market power shapes the implications of consumer privacy on market outcomes.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degreetype" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso" lang="en_US">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Strategic Communication</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Information Economics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Privacy Economics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">Essays in Information and Privacy Economics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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