<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T03:23:31Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/33805" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/33805</identifier><datestamp>2026-10-15T07:10:52Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor">Ruffle, Bradley</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author">Leal, Andrew</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department">Economics</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2026-10-14T14:58:12Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued">2026</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://hdl.handle.net/11375/33805</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://doi.org/10.71548/25575</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract">This thesis comprises three experimental studies examining how information, incentives,
and strategic behavior interact in multi-agent economic environments. A common thread
across the chapters is the use of laboratory experiments to test theoretical predictions in
settings where one party’s choices shape the strategic environment faced by another.
Chapter 1 (joint with Seungjin Han) studies competing mechanism games in which
principals can offer arbitrarily complex contracts that condition transfers on agents’ reports
about competing offers. We extend the Games Played Through Agents framework of
Prat and Rustichini (2003) to allow such mechanisms and establish a static folk theorem
under deviator-reporting mechanisms. We design a laboratory experiment implementing
these mechanisms and observe that, while most agents report truthfully, the probability of
coordinated false reporting increases over the course of the experiment when incentives to
lie are present.
Chapter 2 develops a new experimental framework to study how employers trade off
prosocial behavior against productive ability when ranking candidates for independent jobs.
Using a two-stage design in which Worker signals are generated by real participants and
then evaluated by Managers under incentive-compatible elicitation, I find that Managers
consistently value ability over prosocial behavior, with Managers in STEM fields placing
essentially no weight on prosocial signals. Evidence of homophily emerges on the behavioral
dimension: highly prosocial Managers weigh prosocial behavior substantially more than
other Managers.
Chapter 3 (joint with Zhongheng Qiao) extends Bayesian Persuasion to allow Sellers
to choose both an information-discloser policy and a price, as in Chen and Zhang (2020).
The theoretical model yields an equilibrium in which Sellers either pool with low prices and
provide no information, or fully separate with high prices and full disclosure. We design a
novel experiment which confirms this sorting but identifies risk aversion rather than cost
differences as the empirical driver of strategy selection.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degreetype">Dissertation</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree">Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="language" qualifier="iso">en</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title">Information, Incentives, and Strategic Behavior: Three Experimental Studies</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en">Thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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