<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-11-21T02:02:18Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/5728" metadataPrefix="dim">https://prod-ms-be.lib.mcmaster.ca/server/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:macsphere.mcmaster.ca:11375/5728</identifier><datestamp>2026-09-24T04:13:27Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_11375_271</setSpec><setSpec>col_11375_272</setSpec></header><metadata><dim:dim xmlns:dim="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.dspace.org/xmlns/dspace/dim http://www.dspace.org/schema/dim.xsd">
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="advisor" lang="en_US">Waluchow, W.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="author" lang="en_US">Tapley, Robin L.</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="contributor" qualifier="department" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="accessioned">2014-06-18T16:32:50Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="available">2014-06-18T16:32:50Z</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="created" lang="en_US">2010-05-18</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="date" qualifier="issued" lang="en_US">1997-10</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">opendissertations/1074</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">2627</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="other" lang="en_US">1316192</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">http://hdl.handle.net/11375/5728</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="identifier" qualifier="uri">https://doi.org/10.71548/14820</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="abstract" lang="en_US">&lt;p>This thesis is an investigation of the moral responsibility of physicians in assisted death. I begin with a discussion of the problem that drives the debate concerning end of life decision making. I conclude that the problem faced by those attempting to make decisiosn at the end of life is the bad death. A bad death is marked by a long, debilitating, incapacitating, dying process. Given the problem of the bad death, I discuss what responsibilities the physician might have toward a dying patient. I conclude that the responsibility of a physician is to the wellness of his or her patient, whether that patient is dying or not. For the dying patient, continued existence, or a bad death may count as harm, and a good death as a benefit. Since promoting wellness for a patient means maximizing the benefits and minimizing (or eliminating) the harms, wellness for a dying patient might mean the avoidance of the bad death and the active pursuit of the good death, which I call death management. Since the physician's responsibility is to promote wellness, the physician has a responsibility to promote the good death for a dying patient. Much of my argument hangs on the concept of "dying". I argue for a particular definition of dying and the conceptual distinction between death management and suicide. I defend the claim that physicians have a responsibility to provide death management against the moral difference thesis which holds that it is morally worse to actively kill someone than to merely let that person die. I argue against this thesis and defend instead the moral equivalence thesis which holds that there is no moral difference between bare acts and bare omissions. I also discuss the doctrine of double effect, which represents a potential challenge to my argument. However, I show that the doctrine of double effect is, in fact, not applicable to cases of death management. I condlude with a brief look at some of the concerns should death management become a social policy or legally sanctioned practice. My replies are necessarily brief, but sufficient to show that these concerns are not fatal to the legitimacy of death management.&lt;/p></dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="description" qualifier="degree" lang="en_US">Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="subject" lang="en_US">Philosophy</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="title" lang="en_US">The Moral Permissibility of Physician Assisted Death</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="dc" element="type" lang="en_US">thesis</dim:field>
   <dim:field mdschema="others" element="access-status">open.access</dim:field>
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